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The reciprocal coupling of perception and action in cognitive agents has been firmly
established: perceptions guide action but so too do actions influence what is perceived.
While much has been said on the implications of this for the agent’s external behavior,
less attention has been paid to what it means for the internal bodily mechanisms
which underpin cognitive behavior. In this article, we wish to redress this by reasserting
that the relationship between cognition, perception, and action involves a constitutive
element as well as a behavioral element, emphasizing that the reciprocal link between
perception and action in cognition merits a renewed focus on the system dynamics
inherent in constitutive biological autonomy. Our argument centers on the idea that
cognition, perception, and action are all dependent on processes focussed primarily
on the maintenance of the agent’s autonomy. These processes have an inherently
circular nature—self-organizing, self-producing, and self-maintaining—and our goal is to
explore these processes and suggest how they can explain the reciprocity of perception
and action. Specifically, we argue that the reciprocal coupling is founded primarily on
their endogenous roles in the constitutive autonomy of the agent and an associated
circular causality of global and local processes of self-regulation, rather than being a
mutual sensory-motor contingency that derives from exogenous behavior. Furthermore,
the coupling occurs first and foremost via the internal milieu realized by the agent’s
organismic embodiment. Finally, we consider how homeostasis and the related concept
of allostasis contribute to this circular self-regulation.
Keywords: embodied cognition, autonomy, agency, circular causality, homeostasis, allostasis
1. INTRODUCTION
The reciprocal coupling of perception and action in cognitive agents1 is now well accepted and
there are many examples from neuroscience and psychology, e.g., canonical visuo-motor neurons
(Rizzolatti and Fadiga, 1998), mirror neurons (Rizzolatti et al., 1996; Rizzolatti and Craighero,
2004; Thill et al., 2013), and a variety of ways in which embodiment influences perceptual, motor,
1We here use the term agent to refer to any system that displays a cognitive capacity, whether it is a human or and artificial
cognitive system, such as a cognitive robot.
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and cognitive performance (Varela et al., 1991; Barsalou et al.,
2003). However, cognition is more than a collection of perceptuo-
motor contingencies. In Varela’s words, cognition is effective
action (Maturana and Varela, 1987; Varela et al., 1991): action
that preserves the agent’s autonomy, maintaining the agent
and its ontogeny, i.e., its continued development. Prospection,
i.e., prediction or anticipation, is one of the two hallmarks of
a cognitive agent, the second being the ability to learn new
knowledge by making sense of its interactions with the world
around it and, in the process, enlarging its repertoire of effective
actions (Vernon, 2010; Vernon et al., 2010). Cognition entails
being able to anticipate the need for action and being able
to anticipate the outcome of that action. According to some
theories, e.g., Hesslow’s simulation hypothesis (Hesslow, 2002,
2012), this can be achieved with a form of internal simulation
focusing on goal-directed prospective action selection and
adaptation. Perhaps the best encapsulation of this prospective
goal-directed perceptuo-motor approach is ideomotor theory
(Stock and Stock, 2004).
Such a characterization, however, while necessary and
useful, ascribes only behavioral attributes to cognition. We
wish to reassert here that cognition also has a constitutive
aspect, one that complements the behavioral aspect. The
constitutive/behavioral distinction derives from the constitutive
autonomy and behavioral autonomy of biological agents (Froese
et al., 2007; Froese and Ziemke, 2009), especially those systems
that exhibit the characteristic of recursive self-maintenance
(Bickhard, 2000), capacities that reflect Varela’s and Maturana’s
concepts of autopoiesis (Maturana, 1970, 1975; Maturana and
Varela, 1980), organizational closure (Varela, 1979; Maturana
and Varela, 1987), and operational closure (Froese and Ziemke,
2009; Stewart et al., 2010); see Figure 1. In this view, cognition,
perception, and action serve to support the autonomy of
the agent, both in a constitutive sense and in a behavioral
sense. The constitutive aspect of autonomy focusses on the
dynamic self-organization of the agent as an embodied system,
maintaining itself as a viable structure that can support the
organizational processes in the first place. The behavioral
aspect of autonomy, on the other hand, targets the interaction
of that embodied system with the environment in which it
is embedded, maintaining the external conditions which are
necessary for constitutive autonomy. We develop further the
issue of constitutive autonomy in Section 2 on autonomy and deal
with it more definitively in Section 3 on constitutive processes.
The goal of this article is to argue the case that the reciprocal
coupling of action and perception is founded primarily on their
roles in the constitutive autonomy of the agent and an associated
circular causality of global and local processes of self-regulation,
rather than being a mutual sensory-motor contingency that
derives from exogenous behavior. Our objective is the synthesis
of three strands of thinking into a cohesive picture: (a) the
distinction between constitutive and behavioral autonomy and
related processes, (b) the dynamics of circular causality, and
(c) allostatic self-regulation (in contradistinction to homeostatic
self-regulation). While all of these strands can indeed be traced
to previous work, this paper is, to our knowledge, the first such
synthesis.
FIGURE 1 | A characterization of autonomous agents situated in a
two-dimensional space spanned in one dimension by behavioral
autonomy and in the other by constitutive autonomy (based on Froese
et al., 2007). The behavioral dimension focusses on the degree of
independence of human assistance and the extent to which the system sets
its own goals, and therefore corresponds loosely to what is referred to as the
degree of autonomy in robotics. The constitutive autonomy dimension
focusses on the organizational characteristics that allow the system to
maintain itself as an identifiable autonomous entity. Since some systems don’t
exhibit the requisite organizational characteristics (e.g., organizational closure;
see main text), they aren’t constitutively autonomous. These occupy the white
region at the bottom of the space. Those systems that are constitutively
autonomous can make different levels of contribution to the maintenance of
their autonomy and, thus, this dimension corresponds loosely to strength of
autonomy and the task entropy in robotics (Sheridan and Verplank, 1978).
The article begins with a discussion of biological autonomy,
clarifying the distinction between constitutive and behavioral
autonomy. This sets the scene for the introduction of constitutive
processes. We begin with an explanation of the difference
between self-organization and emergence and then summarize
the key processes of autopoiesis, organizational closure, and
structural coupling. These processes exhibit the pivotal attributes
of continuous reciprocal causation and circular causality. We
consider how homeostasis and the related concept of allostasis
contribute to this circular self-regulation. Finally, we explain
how the reciprocal coupling of perception and action can be
understood in this framework, arguing that the coupling happens
first and foremost via the internal milieu realized by the agent’s
embodiment. In presenting this synthesis, the article integrates
and builds on many quite disparate concepts, not all of which
will be familiar to every reader; an introduction to many of these
ideas can be found in tutorial texts (e.g., Vernon, 2014).
2. AUTONOMY
Autonomy is a difficult concept to tie down (Boden, 2008) and
there are several perspectives on what it means (Froese et al.,
2007). For convenience, we will adopt a definition of autonomy
as the degree of self-determination of a system, i.e., the degree to
which a system’s behavior is not determined by the environment
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and, thus, the degree to which a system determines its own
goals (Ziemke, 1997, 1998; Bertschinger et al., 2008; Seth, 2010;
Vernon, 2014). Implicit in this definition is the idea that, in
addition to selecting its goals, the agent can then choose how
best to achieve them and that it can then act to do so. For
biological autonomous entities, the issue of autonomy becomes
one of survival, typically in the face of precarious conditions,
i.e., environmental conditions in which the entity has to work to
keep itself alive as an autonomous system, both physically and
organizationally as a dynamic self-sustaining entity.
Living systems face two problems: they are delicate and
they are dissipative. Being delicate means that they are easily
disrupted and possibly destroyed by the stronger physical forces
present in their environment (including other biological agents).
Consequently, living systems have to avoid these disruptions and
repair or heal them when they do occur. Dissipation arises from
the fact that living systems are comprised of far-from-equilibrium
processes (Bickhard, 2000). This means that the system must
have some external source of energy or matter if they are to
avoid lapsing into a state of thermodynamic equilibrium. If they
do succumb to this, they come to rest and cease to be able to
change in response to or in anticipation of any external factors
that would threaten their autonomy or their existence2. Again,
as with the delicacy of living systems, the dissipation inherent
in far-from-equilibrium stability means that the system has to
continually acquire resources and repair damage to itself. All of
this has to be done by the agent itself. Of course, it is better if
the agent can avoid damage in the first place and cognition as
a prospective modulator of perception and action is one of the
primary mechanisms at the agent’s disposal (Barandiaran and
Moreno, 2008). By bringing to bear a capacity for prospection,
cognition compensates for the fact that perception is bound to
the here-and-now and allows the agent to anticipate the need for
action and the outcome of that action.
From this perspective, autonomy, aided by cognition, is the
self-maintaining organizational characteristic of living creatures
that enables them to use their own capacities to manage their
interactions with the world in order to remain viable: i.e.,
compensate for dissipation, avoid disruption, and self-repair
when necessary (Christensen and Hooker, 2000). In other words,
autonomy is the process by which a system manages—self-
regulates—to maintain itself as a viable entity in the face
of the precarious circumstances with which the environment
continually confronts it. In Bickhard’s words “the grounds
of cognition are adaptive far-from-equilibrium autonomy—
recursively self-maintenant autonomy” (Bickhard, 2000).
One can distinguish two types of autonomy: behavioral
autonomy and constitutive autonomy (Froese et al., 2007;
Barandiaran and Moreno, 2008; again, refer to Figure 1).
Behavioral autonomy focusses on the external characteristics of
the system: the extent to which the agent sets its own goals
and its robustness and flexibility in dealing with an uncertain
and possibly precarious environment. On the other hand,
2Self-healing structure-maintaining properties are also exhibited by some
non-living non-equilibrium dissipative entropy-producing complex systems
(Kondepudi et al., 2015).
constitutive autonomy focusses on the internal organization and
the organizational processes that keep the system viable and
maintain itself as an identifiable autonomous entity. Agents
that are constitutively autonomous can make different levels
of contribution to the maintenance of their autonomy, making
them less or more effective in dealing with the uncertainty
and precariousness of the environment in which the system
is embedded and in which it has to survive. Behavioral
and constitutive autonomy are linked: an agent can’t deal
with uncertainty and danger if it is not organizationally—
constitutively—equipped to do so. Its behavior depends on
internal preparedness, achieved both through the neural
mechanisms of the central and peripheral nervous system and
the hormonal mechanisms of the endocrine system. On the other
hand, in precarious circumstances, the agent needs behavioral
autonomy to allow it to achieve the requisite environmental
conditions—through interaction—for constitutive autonomy to
be able to operate at all. This complementarity of the constitutive
and the behavioral reflects two different sides of the characteristic
of recursive self-maintenant systems to deploy different processes
of self-maintenance depending on environmental conditions:
one—constitutive autonomy—is the internal endogenous aspect
of that adaptive capacity and the other—behavioral autonomy—
is the external exogenous aspect of that adaptive capacity.
The constitutive-behavioral distinction is sometimes cast
as a difference between constitutive processes and interactive
processes (Froese and Ziemke, 2009). As we have said,
constitutive processes deal with the agent itself, its organization,
and its maintenance as an agent through on-going processes of
self-construction and self-repair. On the other hand, interactive
processes deal with the interaction of the agent with its
environment. Both processes play complementary roles in
autonomous operation of the agents. Constitutive processes are
more fundamental to the autonomy of the agent but both are
required.
3. CONSTITUTIVE PROCESSES
3.1. Self-organization vs. Emergence
Autonomy is closely linked to self-organization. Boden notes that
autonomy, self-organization, and freedom are three notoriously
slippery notions and none of them can be properly understood
without considering the others (Boden, 2008). One definition of
self-organization goes as follows.
“A process in which pattern at the global level of a system
emerges solely from numerous interactions among the lower-
level components of the system. The rules specifying interactions
among the system’s components are executed using only local
information, without reference to the global pattern”
(Camazine, 2006).
Emergence also refers to a process involving interacting
components in a system and the consequent generation of
a global pattern. However, in this case, the global pattern
emerges as something qualitatively different from the underlying
assembly of components and, most significantly, is not simply
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a consequence of the superposition of the contributions of the
individual components3.
The form of self-organization in emergence gives rises
to systems that have a clear identity or behavior that results
from two factors: (a) local-to-global determination and (b)
global-to-local determination. In local-to-global determination,
the emergent process has its global identity constituted
and constrained by local interactions. In global-to-local
determination, the global identity and its interaction with the
system environment constrain the local interactions (Thompson
and Varela, 2001; Froese and Ziemke, 2009; Di Paolo et al., 2010).
This is sometimes referred to as emergent self-organization. Such
self-organization has also been defined as “the spontaneous
emergence (and maintenance) of order, out of an origin that
is ordered to a lesser degree” (Boden, 2008). This definition
provides the key link between self-organization, emergence,
and autonomy: that self-organization results from the intrinsic
spontaneous character of the system (possibly involving
interaction with the environment) rather than being imposed
by some external force or agent. In other words, emergent self-
organization is autonomous and, vice versa, autonomous systems
typically involve some form of emergent self-organization.
Emergent self-organization gives rise to a special view of
autonomy, a view that is also characterized by self-production.
Not only is there a reciprocal local-global and global-local
determination but the nature of the determination is to re-
create the local components from which the global system arises.
This is constitutive autonomy (Froese and Ziemke, 2009). A
system which exhibits constitutive autonomy actively generates
and sustains its existence and systemic identity under precarious
conditions, i.e., conditions that are antagonistic to the delicate
and dissipative nature of the cognitive agent and which, in the
absence of some appropriate form of emergent self-organization
and associated behavior, would cause the system to cease to exist
and cause its identity to be destroyed.
3.2. Self-production and Self-construction:
Autopoiesis and Organizational Closure
Constitutive autonomy is related to the concept of organizational
closure. Varela famously equates autonomy with organizational
closure:
“Autonomous systems are mechanistic (dynamic) systems
defined as a unity by their organization. We shall say that
autonomous systems are organizationally closed. That is, their
organization is characterized by processes such that (1) the processes
are related as a network, so that they recursively depend on each
3Seth distinguishes between nominal, weak, and strong emergence (Seth, 2010).
Nominal emergence is simply the idea that emergence is some property that can
be exhibited by a complete macro-level object or system but not by its constitutent
parts. Strong emergence claims that macro-level properties are in principle not
deducible from observation of the micro-level components and they have causal
powers that are irreducible, i.e., they arise only because of the existence of the
emergent behaviors. These causal powers are directed at the behavior of the
components from which the emergent pattern emerges. Weak emergence sits
somewhere in between nominal and strong emergence. It doesn’t commit to
the principled irreducibility of macroscopic patterns or behavior to microscopic
activity but asserts that the relationship between the two levels is complex.
other in the generation and realization of the processes themselves,
and (2) they constitute the system as a unity recognizable in the
space (domain) in which the processes exist”
(Varela, 1979, p. 55; emphasis in the original).
Maturana and Varela subsequently define autonomy as “the
condition of subordinating all changes to the maintenance of the
organization” (Maturana and Varela, 1980).
Organizational closure is a necessary characteristic of
a particular form of self-producing self-organization called
autopoiesis (Maturana, 1970, 1975) that operates at the bio-
chemical level, e.g., in cellular systems. Autopoietic systems
are quite literally self-organizing systems that self-produce.
Maturana and Varela later expanded the concept to deal
with autonomous systems in general and refer to it in this
context as operational closure, rather than autopoiesis which is
specific to the bio-chemical domain. The operational closure
vs. organizational closure terminology can be confusing because
in some earlier publications (e.g., Varela, 1979), Varela refers
to organizational closure but in later works (by Maturana and
Varela themselves, e.g., Maturana and Varela, 1987, and by
others, e.g., Stewart et al., 2010) this term was subsequently
replaced in favor of operational closure. However, the term
operational closure is appropriate when one wants to identify any
system that is identified by an observer to be self-contained and
parametrically coupled with its environment but not controlled
by the environment. On the other hand, organizational closure
characterizes an operationally-closed system that exhibits some
form of self-production or self-construction (Froese and Ziemke,
2009).
These organizational principles are also reflected in the
concepts of Bickhard’s self-maintenance and recursive self-
maintenance in far-from-equilibrium systems (Bickhard, 2000).
Arguably, these two concepts represent a generalization of
the ideas of self-construction and self-production introduced
by Maturana and Varela in their processes of autopoiesis,
organizational closure, and operational closure. Self-maintenant
systems contribute to the conditions which are necessary to
maintain it, i.e., to keep it going. In contrast, recursive self-
maintenant systems exhibit a stronger form of autonomy in
that they can deploy different processes of self-maintenance
depending on environmental conditions, recruiting different self-
maintenant processes as conditions in the environment require.
Self-maintenance and recursive self-maintenance align well with
the concepts of self-organization and emergent self-organization
(both constitutive and behavioral autonomy), respectively.
3.3. Continuous Reciprocal Causation and
Circular Causality
In the foregoing, there has been a recurring theme: a circular
relationship between part and whole: between local factors and
global factors. It appears that the characteristics of emergence and
emergent self-organization are dependent on dynamic re-entrant
structures. This is related to the concept of continuous reciprocal
causation (CRC; Clark, 1997) which occurs when some system
is both continuously affecting and simultaneously being affected
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 October 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1660
Vernon et al. Embodied cognition and circular causality
by activity in some other system (Clark, 1998)4. In effect, one
system causes an effect in a second system which then causes
an effect in the first, reinforcing the dynamic and causing the
process to continue. CRC can also occur in a single system. In
this case, the causal contribution of each systemic component
partially determines, and is partially determined by, the causal
contributions of large numbers of other systemic components.
Wheeler puts it like this: “CRC is causation that involves multiple
simultaneous interactions and complex dynamic feedback loops,
such that (a) the causal contribution of each systemic component
partially determines, and is partially determined by, the causal
contributions of large numbers of other systemic components,
and, moreover, (b) those contributions may change radically over
time” (Wheeler, 2008).
This single-system CRC is often referred to as circular
causality or circular causation (Varela, 1979). While circular
causality can occur between distinct sub-systems in this overall
system, it more usually reflects the interaction between global
system dynamics (the whole) and local system dynamics (the
parts). For example, Kelso uses the term circular causality
to describe the situation in dynamical systems where the
cooperation of the individual parts of the system determines
the global system behavior which, in turn, governs the behavior
of these individual parts (Kelso, 1995). Thus, circular causality
exists between levels of a hierarchy of system and sub-system.
This influence of macroscopic levels on microscopic levels in
a system is captured in the term downward causation i.e., that
global-to-local or macroscopic-to-microscopic aspect of circular
causality whereby the global system behavior causally influences
the individual system components (Thompson and Varela, 2001;
Seth, 2010). In circularly causal systems, global system behavior
influences the local behavior of the system components and
yet it is the local interaction between the components that
determines the global behavior. Thus, in biological autonomy,
the degree of participation of the components of a system is
determined by the global behavior which, in turn, is determined
by the interactions among the components through causal
reciprocal feedback loops. Again, these ideas are also echoed
in Bickhard’s concept of recursive self-maintenance (Bickhard,
2000).
The idea of circular causality is also related to the notion
of entrainment where the global macro state entrains the
micro-constituent processes of which it comprises in order
to maintain that macro state. This has been applied to
higher level forms of constitutive processing, e.g., in human
emotions, where the macro states provide a substrate for
learning (Lewis, 2005). Similarly, circular causality is a central
feature of an information-theoretic model of self-sustainability,
i.e., autonomy, in ecosystem networks (Ulanowicz, 1998, 2000,
2011). The same model has been used to characterize the
emergence and development of beliefs in human cognition
(Castillo et al., in press). This network-centric perspective aligns
with the interaction-dominant view of cognitive dynamics which
4Reciprocal causation (Laland et al., 2012) also exists between proximate and
ultimate mechanisms of evolutionary biology (Mayr, 1961; Tinbergen, 1963; Scott-
Phillips et al., 2011).
highlights that cognition is characterized by interactions among
multiple spatial and temporal scales of organization and among
nested structures, rather than by relationships between simpler
components at a single scale (i.e., the component-dominant view;
Ihlen and Vereijken, 2010; Dixon et al., 2012).
4. REALIZING CIRCULAR CAUSALITY
Howmight circular causality bemanifest in a cognitive agent and,
more generally, in a system that exhibits constitutive autonomy?
In this section, we consider how homeostasis and the related
concept of allostasis contribute to circular global-to-local and
local-to-global self-regulation.
4.1. Homeostasis
The process of self-regulation is central to constitutive autonomy.
In biological systems, the automatic regulation of physiological
functions is referred to as homeostasis, a term coined by Cannon
(1929) formalizing the idea advanced in the nineteenth century
by Claude Bernard that “all the vital mechanisms, however varied
they may be, have only one object, that of preserving constant
the conditions of life in the internal environment" (Bernard,
1878). Put simply, homeostatic processes regulate the operation
of a system in order to keep the value of some system variables
constant or within acceptable bounds, e.g., body temperature
and blood glucose level. It does this by sensing any deviation
from the desired value and feeding this error back to the control
mechanism to correct the error. The desired value is called the
setpoint in control theory and the use of the deviation from the
desired value is called feedback.
We have in previous work (Morse et al., 2008; Ziemke and
Lowe, 2009) suggested that the autonomy of an agent is effected
through a hierarchy of homeostatic self-regulatory processes,
exploiting a spectrum of associated affective (i.e., emotional or
feeling) states, ranging from basic reflexes linked to metabolic
regulation, through drives and motives, and on to the emotions
and feelings often linked to higher cognitive functions. The
progression of processes of homeostasis from basic reflexes and
metabolic regulation, through drives and motives, to emotions
and feelings is described in a schema for a cognitive architecture
that places affect on an equal footing with more conventional
cognitive processes. This progression follows closely Damasio’s
hierarchy of levels of homeostatic regulation (Damasio, 2003)
and is based on a relatively broad notion of homeostasis as
“the process of maintaining the internal milieu physiological
parameters (such as temperature, pH and nutrient levels) of
a biological system within the range that facilitates survival
and optimal function” (Damasio, 2003; Damasio and Carvalho,
2013). Different homeostatic processes regulate different system
properties.
Typically, the autonomous agent is perturbed during
interactions with the world with the result that the organizational
dynamics have to be adjusted. This process of adjustment is
exactly what is meant by homeostasis— self-regulation—and the
motives at every level of this hierarchy of homeostatic processes
are effectively the drives that are required to return the agent
to a state where its autonomy is no longer threatened. In the
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interaction with the world around it, the perturbations of the
agent by the environment have no intrinsic value in their own
right—they are just the stuff that happens to the agent as it
goes about its business of survival—but for the agent this stuff,
these interactions and perturbations, have a perceived value in
that they act to endanger or support its autonomy. This value
is conveyed through the affective aspect of these homeostatic
processes and consequently the agent then attaches some value
to what is an otherwise neutral world (even if it is a precarious
one; Di Paolo, 2005). The implications for perception and
action are significant and this brings us to the crucial issue
regarding the reciprocal coupling of action and perception in
cognition.
First, perceptions and actions form a complementary set
of environment-agent/agent-environment perturbations that are
related not as extrinsic stimulus-response perceptuo-motor
contingencies but as intrinsic processes that lead to the regulation
of the system and autonomy preservation through emergent
self-organization. The processes of perception and action are
mutually dependent because they are both modulated by
the system—globally-determined—through downward causation
and, together with other homeostatic processes, they give rise to
the global constitutive autonomy-preserving system behavior.
Second, perception and action are reciprocally coupled
and mutually dependent because, from the perspective of
enactive cognitive science, perception and action form a joint
process of making sense of the world in which the agent is
embedded (Maturana and Varela, 1987; Varela et al., 1991;
Vernon, 2010). This “sense” captures the lawfulness of the
agent’s environment as it relates to the agent’s constitutive and
behavioral autonomy. Since the agent is an organizationally
closed system, perception and action are perturbing forces
rather than system inputs and outputs. This process of mutual
perturbation of the agent and environment in which it is
embedded, facilitating the on-going operational identity of
the agent and its autonomous self-maintenance, is known as
structural coupling. The process of structural coupling produces
an embodiment-specific congruence between the system and its
environment. For this reason, we say that the system and the
environment are co-determined. In enactive cognitive science,
this is also referred to as structural determination to emphasize
the dependence of an agent’s space of viable environmentally-
triggered changes on the agent’s structure, i.e., its particular
embodiment, and its internal dynamics (Maturana and Varela,
1987; Varela et al., 1991).
4.2. Allostasis
While many autonomous agents are self-governing in the sense
that they adjust automatically to events in the environment and
self-correct when necessary (e.g., by way of homeostasis), other
autonomous agents begin to adjust before the event actually
occurs. This form of autonomy requires a continual preparation
for what might be coming next. It means that an autonomous
system anticipates what events might occur in its environment
and actively prepares for them so that it is capable of dealing with
them if they do occur. From this perspective, autonomy requires
pre-emptive action, not just reactive action, and predictive self-
regulation, not just reactive self-regulation. These autonomous
systems ready themselves for multiple contingencies, i.e., possible
events, and have several strategies for dealing with them. They
deploy them while pursuing some goal or other that the system
has defined for itself. To an extent, this characteristic can be
viewed as predictive self-regulation and is known as allostasis
(Sterling, 2004; Schulkin, 2011; Sterling, 2012).
Allostasis encourages a rethink of the classical control
theoretic perspective on homeostasis revolving around feedback
loops respecting set points that demarcate ideal states. According
to Sterling (Sterling, 2004), allostasis can be conceived in terms of
prediction where brain areas implicated in planning and decision
making are viewed as supplying inputs that may override other
inputs that signal errors from ideal homeostatic balance. Such
global overriding of “basal” homeostasis operates in the service
of supplying the organism with the resources previously learned
to be necessary to meet predicted environmental pressures.
Sterling considers allostasis as a means of permitting adaptive
bodily regulation according to “stability through change” which
accounts for both internal needs and external pressures (or
opportunities) in contrast to the Bernard notion of “stability
through constancy.” Thus, allostasis is concerned with adapting
to change in order to achieve the goal of stability in the face
of uncertain circumstances. Efficient regulation requires the
anticipation of needs and preparation to satisfy them before
they arise: “The brain monitors a very large number of external
and internal parameters to anticipate changing needs, evaluate
priorities, and prepare the organism to satisfy them before
they lead to errors. The brain even anticipates its own local
needs, increasing flow to certain regions—before there is an
error signal” (Sterling, 2012). For example, human behavior in
adapting to pain involves such predictive regulation, rather than
mere reaction to tissue damage; that means “the nervous system
is organized to anticipate potential pain and to adjust behavior
before the risk of tissue damage becomes critical” (Morrison et al.,
2013).
Allostasis, rather than being based on a reciprocal sharing of
resources among systems (classic homeostasis), entails a degree
of centralized control over sub-systems (Sterling, 2012). This
can also be viewed in terms of downward causation: while
Lewis (2005) references the macroscopic state that entrains
its “emotion”-based microscopic constituents in the service of
learning, Sterling (2012), p. 14, refers to “[memory] retrieval
involv[ing] elaborate connections within “limbic” structures
... that ... project in cascades to prefrontal cortex.” The
limbic (emotion) system’s constituents subserve constitutive
organization (they relay signals related to sustaining the viability
of the organism) and may be entrained by prefrontal cortex
(which also reciprocally connects to neocortex) to facilitate
adaptive behavior over a goal-directed sequence.
The focus on predictive regulation in allostasis mirrors
strongly the anticipatory nature of cognition. Seth (2013)
emphasizes this by developing the role that interoceptive
predictive coding (as distinct from the more usual view of
prospection in exteroceptive predictive coding) plays in the
experience of “body ownership and conscious selfhood,” viewing
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emotions—subjective feeling states—as emerging from cognitive
evaluations of physiological changes. As such, he targets a larger
quarry in cognitive science: consciousness and neuropsychiatric
illness. He hypothesizes that predictive coding arises through
“an extended autonomic neural substrate” (Seth, 2013), p. 565,
taking the principle on which allostasis is based—the causal
role played by prediction in biological regulation—to the next
level. Specifically, he highlights the role of active inference,
an extension of predictive coding, whereby the interoceptive
prediction errors can be suppressed not by updating the
generative model that gave rise to the predictions but by internal
action, translating the predictions into reference points for
autonomic regulatory processes, e.g., physiological homeostasis.
He notes that attention can then be viewed as a way of balancing
active inference and model update, (referred to as precision
weighting). Seth reinforces the idea that “an organism should
maintain well-adapted predictivemodels of its own physical body
... and of its internal physiological condition” (Seth, 2013), p. 567,
and in Seth (2015) he develops this further, grounding predictive
coding, active infererence, and the principle of free energy in
cybernetics and allostatic mechanisms for the maintenance of
internal organization. Barrett and Simmons (2015) emphasize
the same point with their Embodied Predictive Interoception
Coding (EPIC) model, pointing out the direct link between active
inference in the cortex and interceptive predictions of the internal
milieu of the body, i.e., its physiological state relating to, e.g.,
heart rate, glucose levels, carbon dioxide in the bloodstream, and
temperature.
In summary, allostasis differs from homeostasis in its
predictive character and in its ability to anticipate and adapt to
change rather than resist it. Significantly, allostasis is effected
at a higher level of organization, involving greater number
of sub-systems acting together in a coordinated manner with
global processes modulating local ones, reflecting the character
of circular causality. In contrast, mechanisms for homeostasis
operate at a simpler level of negative feedback control (Sterling,
2004; Muntean and Wright, 2007; Sterling, 2012). Although
you can view allostasis as a complementary mechanism to
homeostasis, Sterling notes that it was introduced as a potential
replacement for homeostasis as the core model of physiological
regulation (Sterling, 2004, 2012).
In the next section, we look briefly at one example of how the
principles of homeostasis and allostasis can be used to describe
how cognition arises through constitutive autonomy.
4.3. Toward a Constitutive Autonomy
Cognitive Architecture
Based on Damasio’s view of the architecture and physiology of
the mammalian brain, we have in previous work proposed two
schemas for an enactive cognitive architecture that explicitly
embraces the constitutive-behavioral distinction (Morse et al.,
2008; Ziemke and Lowe, 2009). They are schemas in the sense
that they identify the principal characteristics of the architecture
without providing a detailed design of the component parts
of the architecture and the dynamics of their interaction. A
design approach called holistic-reductionism complements the
schemas, focussing on the interdependencies of the components
rather than on the identification of independent functional
modules, as is normally the case with computational cognitive
architecture design. Any modularity in the system emerges from
the interdependence of the embodied cognitive processes rather
than by phylogenetic pre-specificiation.
The first version of the architecture schema traverses two
dimensions: (i) Constitutive Organization and (ii) Behavioral
FIGURE 2 | The three strands of thought being advanced in this paper are (A) the distinction between constitutive and behavioral autonomy and
related processes, (B) the dynamics of circular causality, and (C) predictive allostatic self-regulation. The Cognitive-Affective Architecture Schematic in (A)
is an example of the first aspect. It exhibits a spectrum of constitutive organization brought about by the recruitment of a progression of emotions, from reflexes,
through drives and motivations, to emotions-proper and feelings. Each level in the constitutive organization is associated on the Internal Organization axis with an
increasing level of homeostatic autonomy-preserving self-maintenance, ranging from basic metabolic processes through reactive sensorimotor activity (pre-somatic
effects), associative learning and prediction (somatic modulation), to interoception and internal simulation of behavior prior to action. Equally, each level in the
constitutive organization is associated on the Behavioral Organization axis with an increasing level of complexity in behavior, ranging from approach-avoidance,
sequenced behaviors, and multi-sequenced behaviors. A more complete cognitive architecture that fully embraces constitutive autonomy would also incorporate
processes for circular causality and allostasis.
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Organization (Morse et al., 2008). The former refers to the
system’s internal dynamics as it maintains its integrity—its
autonomy—in the face of perturbation by various stimuli. At the
core of this space there is metabolic homeostatic self-regulation.
This extends to stimulus valence evaluation, somatic state
response, and content evaluation, each level offering increasing
organizational complexity, an increasing degree of decoupling
between stimulus and response, and an increasing degree of
appraisal and associated adaptivity. Each level in the constitutive
organization dimension is matched by an associated level in
the behavioral organization dimension: approach-avoidance,
sequenced behavior, and multi-sequenced behavior, respectively.
Thus, the behavioral organization dimension is coupled by
sensorimotor perception to the constitutive organizational
dimension.
A later version of the architecture (see Figure 2) reflects
this coupling by referring to a single space of constitutive
organization which is viewed from two perspectives: internal
organization and behavioral organization (Ziemke and Lowe,
2009). The spectrum of constitutive organization is realized by
the recruitment of a progression of emotions, from reflexes,
through drives and motivations, to emotions-proper and
feelings. Each level in constitutive organization is associated
on the internal organization axis with an increasing level
of homeostatic autonomy-preserving self-maintenance, ranging
from basic metabolic processes through reactive sensorimotor
activity (pre-somatic effects), associative learning and prediction
(somatic modulation), to interoception and internal simulation
of behavior prior to action. Equally, each level in constitutive
organization is associated on the behavioral organization axis
with an increasing level of complexity in behavior, ranging from
approach-avoidance, sequenced behaviors, and multi-sequenced
behaviors.
The key idea is that different levels of cognitive function
and behavioral complexity are associated with, and are brought
about by, different levels of emotion, each linked to affective
homeostatic processes ranging from reflexes right through
to internal simulation. An extension of this schematic that
augmented the homeostatic processes with allostatic ones would
embrace more fully the concepts of constitutive autonomy
advanced in this paper, including, as we have mentioned above,
circular causality.
5. CONCLUSION
Cognition is commonly cast as a prospective process of
adaptation, growth, and development (Vernon, 2010; Vernon
et al., 2010), often focussing on behavioral autonomy.
Here, however, we have recast cognition in a different light
that emphasizes the importance of constitutive autonomy.
Specifically, we have argued for a form of predictive regulation—
allostasis—that is intrinsic to adaptive agents and exhibits a
type of circular causality that naturally gives rise to reciprocal
coupling of perception and action in embodied agents. The
resulting synthesis of these different lines of thinking lead us to
argue that perceptions and actions form a complementary set of
environment-agent/agent-environment perturbations that are
related not only as extrinsic stimulus-response perceptuo-motor
contingencies but also as intrinsic processes that lead to the
regulation of the system and autonomy preservation through
emergent self-organization. The perceptions and actions are
mutually dependent because they are both modulated by the
system—globally-determined—through downward causation.
Together they form a process of mutual perturbation of the
agent and environment in which it is embedded, i.e., structural
coupling, that facilitates both constitutive and behavioral
autonomy. It remains as a significant research challenge to
uncover the specific mechanisms by which circular causality
and allostasis arise in natural agents and how—and to what
degree—they might be replicated in artificial systems.
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